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Harrop: Formulation of the Two Part Analysis for State Action Exemption -

FORMULATION OF THE TWO PART ANALYSIS
STATE ACTION EXEMPTION: Hoover v. Ronwin, - U.S.
S. Ct. 1989 (1984).

-,

FOR
104

INTRODUCTION

Since 1890 when the Sherman Antitrust Act (the Act)1 was
passed, governmental units and agencies have sought exemption
from the Act's provisions.2 The Supreme Court, in Parker v.
Brown,3 determined that states, when acting in their sovereign capacity, were deemed exempt by the very language of the Act. Since
1943, the Supreme Court has tried to define precisely which actions performed by various government associated groups constitute state action for which the exemption applies." The Court's objective has been to develop a clear application of the state action
exemption which is broad enough to preserve the states' sovereign
rights to conduct their own economic policies, yet narrow enough
to prevent the exemption from protecting purely private actors
and, thereby, destroying the Acts federal antitrust purpose. Over
1. The relevant section is 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) which prohibits "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations . .. ."
2. Such groups include the federal judiciary, Congress, municipalities, professional organizations and, of course, states. See generally Comment, State Action Antitrust Immunity: The Parker Doctrine'sApplication to Municipalities,8
OHIO N.U.L. REV. 513 (1981).
3. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). It is usually common to talk of the exemption as
being judicially granted by Parker. However, the Supreme Court found in that
case that as Congress constitutionally could occupy the entire "legislative field"
and chose not to do so ("We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or
in its history which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers
or agents from activities directed by its legislature.") the exemption was Congressionally granted and judicially applied. 317 U.S. at 350-51. It is interesting to note
that Congress has not attempted to remove that exemption from the states.
4. This note will refer to the Parker doctrine as an exemption or as the
Parker doctrine. Various authors, judges and Justices have referred to it haphazardly as an immunity, exemption, principle or doctrine. For an interesting article
discussing the possible legal consequences of the Parker doctrine being an exemption rather than a grant of immunity see Kopetz, State Action and the Sherman
Antitrust Act: Should the Antitrust Laws Be Given a Preemptive Effect?, 14
CONN. L. REV. 135 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Kopetz].
5. In Parker,the Court determined that liability for state action was left out
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the years, the Court's actual holdings in state action cases are remarkably consistent. However, the Court's terminology has created
unnecessary confusion for commentators, judges and Justices.
Hoover v. Ronwin 6 represents the Court's latest attempt to
achieve the two part goal of protecting the federalist basis of
Parker while establishing an understandable framework for analyzing state action cases. In Hoover, the Court found that, when the
Arizona Committee on Examinations and Admissions to the State
Bar graded bar examinations according to the Rules of the Arizona
Supreme Court, the Committee's actions were exempt from the
Act. Justice Powell 7 first scrutinized the Court's prior applications
of the exemption and structured an opinion consistent with the
prior rulings. He stated the conditions that must exist before the
Court applies the exemption. In so doing, Justice Powell clarified
the analytical process the Court must follow in deciding state action cases, a process which the Court previously had difficulty explaining. Certainly inconsistencies arise when any analysis is applied to various fact situations, and, probably, Justice Powell's
process will be no exception. It is, however, a clear, logical step in
the progression the Court has been following since at least the
1970s.1
This note begins by discussing the Hoover case in light of the
actual holding by the Court. It then tracks the history of the
Parker doctrine and examines the Court's progression in attempting to formulate a practical analysis for the state exemption. Finally, the note shows that Justice Powell's opinion in Hoover articulated a clear and workable analytical process based on, and
consistent with, previous Court decisions.
of the Sherman Act because of federalist principles. 317 U.S. at 350, 351. See also
Morgan, Antitrust and State Regulation: Standards of Immunity After Midcal,
35 ARK. L. REv. 453, 459 (1981).
6. -U.S.-, 104 S. Ct. 1989 (1984).
7. This decision was written by Justice Powell. Justices Rehnquist and
O'Connor took no part in the decision and Justices Stevens, White and Blackmun
dissented. Note that though only two of the decisions discussed herein are plurality decisions, some of the concurring opinions have led to confusion over what
"test" to apply in Parker cases.
8. Certainly not all commentators think of the Parker doctrine history as a
progression. See generally Handler, Antitrust- 1978, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1363
(1978).
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Edward Ronwin was an unsuccessful candidate for admission
to the Arizona bar in 1974.1 According to the Arizona Constitution,
the Arizona Supreme Court has complete authority to determine
admissions to the bar.' 0 Pursuant to that authority the supreme
court formulated the Arizona Supreme Court Rules." Under the
Rules in effect in 1974, the supreme court established the Committee on Examinations and Admissions (Committee) to examine applicants on specified subjects and to recommend applicants for admission to the Arizona Bar.'" The seven member Committee, 3
appointed by the supreme court, was authorized to "utilize such
grading or scoring system as the Committee deems appropriate in
its discretion" in grading the examinations. 4 Rule 28(c) VII B required the Committee to submit its "proposed" grading formula to
the court thirty days "before each examination.' ' 5 After grading
the examination the Committee was to compile a list of those applicants whom it considered to "have the necessary qualifications"
for admission to the bar and file it with the supreme court, which
was to take final action on the matter. 6 Only the court, under Rule
28(a) and Arizona case law, had final authority to grant or deny
admission. 1 7 A rejected candidate had the right to seek individual9. The facts presented here are essentially a restatement of the Court's at
104 S.Ct. at 1991-94, and the notes contained therein.

10.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 32-275 (1956).

11. 104 S.Ct. at 1991.
12. The North Carolina Supreme Court does not exercise control over the
admission to the bar. Admission is controlled by a Board of Examiners which is
elected by the Council of the North Carolina State Bar. All applications are sent
to the Board and the Board determines whether or not an applicant is accepted.
Of course, a rejected applicant can appeal the Board's decision to the courts.
There is no control or supervision by the North Carolina Supreme Court. N.C.
Rules of Ct., Admission to the Practice of Law, §§ .0103, .0401, .1401 (1984).
13. Only four of the seven members were petitioners for certiorari to the
Supreme Court. Ronwin did, however, name all seven in his complaint. 104 S.Ct.
at 1991, n.1.
14. Ariz. Sup. Ct. Rule 28 (a) (1973).
15. Ariz. Sup. Ct. Rule 28 (c) (1973).
16. Ariz. Sup. Ct. Rule 28 (a) (1973).
17. Rule 28(a); Application of Courtney, 83 Ariz. 23"1, 233, 319 P.2d 991, 993
(1957). (The supreme court, "may in the exercise of its inherent powers, admit to
the practice of law with or without favorable action by the Committee."); Hackin
v. Lockwood, 361 F.2d 499, 501 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 960 (1966).
("[W]e find the power to grant or deny admission is vested solely in the Arizona
Supreme Court.").
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ized review of an adverse Committee recommendation by filing a
petition with the court. 8
After Ronwin failed the Arizona Bar exam in 1974, "the Committee recommended to the Arizona Supreme Court that it deny
him admission to the Bar and the court accepted that recommendation."' 9 The Arizona Supreme Court denied Ronwin's petition
for review of the Committee's actions in conducting and grading
the examinations. Ultimately,20 he filed this action in Federal District Court against the Arizona State Bar, members of the Committee and others. 2 '
Ronwin alleged, among other things, that the Committee "had
18. Rule 28(c) provided that an "applicant aggrieved by any decision of the
Committee . . .(C) for any substantial cause other than with respect to a claimed
failure to award a satisfactory grade upon an examination; may within 20 days
after such occurrence file a verified petition with this Court for a review .... "
The Rule further provided for a copy of the petition to be served "promptly"
upon the chairman or some member of the Committee. Within 15 days of receiving the petition the Committee was to transmit the applicant's file, along with the
Committee's reasons for not recommending the applicant, to the Arizona Supreme Court. The court would then "hold such hearings and give such directions
as it may in its discretion deem best adapted to a prompt and fair decision as to
the rights and obligations of the applicant judged in the light of the Committee's
and [the] [c]ourt's obligation to the public to see that only qualified applicants
are admitted to practice as attorneys at law." 104 S. Ct. at 1993, n.8.
19. 104 S. Ct. at 1993.
20. This case actually has an interesting history (referred to as a "long, unhappy and complex history" by Justice Feldman in his opinion at In re Ronwin,
136 Ariz. 566, -, 667 P.2d 1281, 1282 (1983).) In his petition for review Ronwin
alleged that the Committee had failed to "provide him with model answers to the
examination, had failed to file its grading formula with the court within the time
period specified in the Rules, had applied a draconian pass-fail process, had
used a grading formula that measured group, rather than individual, performance,
had failed to test applicants on an area of the law on which the Rules required
testing, . . . had conducted the examination in a pressure-cooker atmosphere[,]
• . .abused its discretion, deprived him of due process and equal protection, and
violated the Sherman Act. 104 S. Ct. at 1993. That petition was denied by the
court, as were two other petitions for rehearing and retesting. (See In re Ronwin,
136 Ariz. 566, 667 P.2d 1281 (1983) for an enlightening recount of Mr. Ronwin's
ongoing "feud" with the state bar and the Arizona Supreme Court.) Ronwin's petition for certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court. Ronwin v.
Committee on Examinations and Admissions, 419 U.S. 967 (1974).
21. Ronwin v. State Bar of Arizona, 686 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1981). Also
named as defendants were the Committee member's spouses. The district court
dismissed the suit as to these defendants and the court of appeals affirmed the
dismissal. Id. That aspect of the case was challenged in a conditional cross-petition for certiorari, which was denied. Ronwin v. Hoover, 103 S.Ct. 2110 (1983).
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set the grading scale on his examination with reference to the
number of new attorneys that it thought desirable, rather than
with reference to some suitable level of competence." 2 2 To Ronwin,
that constituted a conspiracy to restrain trade in violation of § 1 of
the Sherman Act by "artificially reducing the number of competing
attorneys in the State of Arizona."2 Ronwin also argued that, "although [Committee members] qualified as state officials in their
capacity as members of the Committee, they acted independently
of the Arizona Supreme Court" when devising the grading
formula.2" To Ronwin, the Committee's actions were not the
court's actions, thus the Committee members were not entitled to
the Parker exemption.2
The members alleged that they were immune from antitrust
liability under the Parker doctrine, since by acting at the supreme
court's direction, their actions constituted state action.2 6 The District Court of the District of Arizona agreed with the Committee
and granted, inter alia, the Committee members' motion to dismiss the complaint under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6), the failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.2 7 The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, stating that simply because
the "Arizona Supreme Court has delegated to the Committee the
general authority to examine applicants to determine if they are
qualified to practice law and reviews the Committee's recommendations" the Committee was not clothed with immunity.2 8 The
court of appeals held that the Committee members could not establish that the alleged restraint was "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy" and therefore the district
court had improperly dismissed the complaint. The case was remanded to the district court for further action.2 9
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the court of
22. 104 S. Ct. at 1994. Ronwin alleged that the Committee devised its grading formula after the exam was administered. This allowed the Committee to recommend a particular number of applicants and structure the formula accordingly.
Id. at 1994, 1994 n.13.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1996.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1994.
27. Id. at 1994. The members also moved to dismiss the complaint under
FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, which was also
granted. Id.
28. 686 F.2d at 696.
29. Id. at 701.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1984

5

Campbell
Law Review,
Vol. REVIEW
7, Iss. 2 [1984], Art. 6
CAMPBELL
LAW

[Vol. 7:231

appeals' application of the state action doctrine. The Court's plurality, relying on Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,30 decided that the
actions of the Committee could not "be divorced from the [Arizona] Supreme Court's exercise of its sovereign powers" 3 1 since,
under the Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court, the court exercised
the only authority as to who would, or would not, be granted admission to the bar.3 2 Justice Powell wrote that since the Arizona
Supreme Court was actually the "real party in interest, '33 and the
court had established the Rules under its legislative capacity, the
actions complained of were State actions. Therefore, under the
Parker doctrine, the Committee actions were exempt from antitrust liability.34
BACKGROUND

As Justice Powell stated in Hoover, "[t]he starting point in
any analysis involving the state action doctrine is the reasoning of
Parker v. Brown.' '3 5 In Parker, a raisin producer-packer brought
suit against California officials, challenging that the California Agricultural Prorate Act violated, inter alia, the Sherman Antitrust
Act. The California Legislature had enacted the Prorate Act as a
program to be enforced "through action of state officials . . . to
restrict competition among the [raisin] growers and maintain
prices in the distribution of their commodities to packers. "36
The Parker Court stated that "nothing in the language of the
Sherman Act or in its history . . . suggests that its purpose was to
restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by
its legislature. '3 7 Since the prorate program "derived its authority
and its efficacy from the legislative command of the state and was
not intended to operate or become effective without that command",3" the program and its officials were held exempt from the
Sherman Act. 39 The Court stressed that a state cannot "give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them
30.
31.

433 U.S. 350 (1977).
104 S. Ct. at 1996.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Supra note 17.
104 S. Ct. at 1999 (quoting Bates, 433 U.S. at 361).
104 S. Ct. at 1998.
Id. at 1995.
317 U.S. at 346.
317 U.S. at 350, 351. See supra note 5.
317 U.S. at 350.
Id. at 352.
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to violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawful."40 The
state's direction must precede the action.
The Court then stated four important considerations which
led to its decision: 1) it was the "state which created the machinery
for establishing the prorate program;" 2) even though the "organization of a prorate zone is proposed by producers, and a prorate
program, approved by the Commission, must also be approved by
referendum of producers, it is the state, acting through the Commission, which adopts the program and enforces it with penal
sanctions;" 3) the state and its appointees acted "in the execution
of a governmental policy;" and 4) the state "itself exercises its legislative authority in making the regulation and in prescribing the
conditions of its application.""'
The decision stands for the proposition that the Sherman Act
does not apply to cases where the state acts in its sovereign capacity, through its officers or agents, in activities "directed by its legislature." The Court will not inquire into the motive of the state in
enacting and carrying out the anti-competitive program. The inquiry ends when the Court finds that it is the state that establishes, administers and supervises the program.'
From 1943 until 1975 the Supreme Court did not deal directly
with the Parker doctrine and the lower courts had to attempt to
define it.' 3 Beginning with Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar in
1975," the Supreme Court decided numerous cases concerned with
the Parker doctrine.6 A chronological discussion of the most important cases follows.'
40. Id. at 351, citing Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197,
332, 344-347 (1904).
41. 317 U.S. at 352.
42. At least one commentator, and a few courts, believe that this exemption
extends to other antitrust legislation. Burling, et. al. , "State Action" Antitrust
Immunity-A Doctrine in Search of Definitions, 1982 B.Y.U.L. REV. 809, 812 and

note [hereinafter cited as Burling].
43. As Richards, Exploring the FarReaches of the State Action Exemption:
Implications for Federalism,57 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 274 (1983) [hereinafter cited as

Richards] states in the text on page 280 and notes 34 and 35, the lower courts
"struggled to define the parameters of the Parker exemption."
44. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
45. These are the most important cases in terms of this Note. One very important field in the Parker context is that of municipalities. Besides the Boulder
and Lafayette cases discussed herein, the Court will soon hear various questions
concerning the rights of municipalities to grant monopolistic franchises. The
Court might even rethink its reasoning in Boulder and Lafayette. See Middleton,
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Goldfarb involved a suit by homebuyers wishing to employ a
lawyer for less than the minimum fee as published in the county
bar association schedule of fees. Upon finding that no lawyer
would perform a title search for less, the Goldfarbs sued the state
and county bars, alleging that the minimum fee schedule violated
the Sherman Act by restraining trade."
The fee schedule listed recommended minimum prices for
common legal services. The county bar association published the
schedule and the state bar enforced it by disciplinary action."
Though no evidence existed that the state bar ever had taken formal disciplinary action, the bar had published ethical opinions and
reports "suggesting" that a presumption of misconduct would be
raised if any attorney "habitually charges less than the suggested
minimum fee schedule adopted by his local bar
Association .
.
The state bar argued that it was "merely implementing the fee
provision of the ethical codes" by issuing fee schedules and ethical
opinions dealing with those schedules."9 The county bar argued
that the ethical codes and the state bar opinions "prompted" it to
issue fee schedules, thereby entitling it to the Parkerexemption. 50
The Goldfarb Court, in refusing to apply Parker, stated that
the "threshold inquiry" in determining whether the activity complained of is state action is "whether the activity is required by the
State acting as sovereign."5 1 The Court found that the State of
Virginia did not require the anticompetitive activities through its
Supreme Court Rules,52 nor did the state supreme court supervise
the institution of the fee schedules or approve of the ethical opinions.5 The Court also stated that though the state bar is a "state
agency for some limited purposes, [that] does not create a shield
that allows it to foster anticompetitive practices for the benefit of
its members. ' 54 In the most quoted line of the case, the Goldfarb
New Antitrust Act May Do Little to Stem Suits, National Law Journal, Dec. 3,
1984, at 1, col. 3.
46. 421 U.S. at 776-78.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 777-78 and n.5.
49. Id. at 790.
50. Id.
51. Id., citing Parker,317 U.S. at 350-52.
52. Id. at 790 and n.20, 789 n.18.
53. Id. at 791.
54. Id. Note that the Court included actions by the state supreme court to
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol7/iss2/6
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Court held that it "is not enough that, as the County Bar puts it,
anticompetitive conduct is 'prompted' by state action; rather, anticompetitive activities must be compelled by direction of the
State acting as a sovereign. '' 55 Since the state did not compel the
bar associations to establish the fee schedules, the bars' actions in
so doing were not exempt from the provisons of the Sherman Act.
Thus, the Court remained consistent with Parker.The bar
associations had no "legislative command of the state '5 6 to enact
price floors and the state could not give, ex post facto, "immunity
to those who violate the Sherman Act . . .by declaring that their
action is lawful. ' 57 If that clear legislative command had been present, the actions performed pursuant to that order would have
been exempt. The actions would have been, in effect, those of the
state itself. Goldfarb provides an example of an agency, which, because it has state authority to conduct certain activities, tries to
cloak every action with state authorization. Activities of that kind
which violate antitrust laws will not be granted exemption from
those laws.
The Court fragmented in its next attempt to explain the degree of state "direction" necessary to empower groups to act as the
state. In Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,58 decided in 1976, a retail
druggist who sold light bulbs sued Detroit Edison, a privately
owned utility, for its role in a state approved pr6gram whereby Detroit Edison supplied to its customers at no cost, fifty percent of
the standard lightbulbs used by its customers. 9 The program had
been approved by the Michigan Public Service Commission."0
In this plurality decision the Court held that the state regulatory body's simple rubber stamping of anticompetitive conduct was
not enough to confer a Parker exemption. 1 However, the Court
be exempt as actions by a sovereign.
55. Id.
56. 317 U.S. at 350.
57. Id. at 351.
58. 428 U.S. 579 (1976). Justice Stevens wrote the Court's opinion, joined by
Justices Brennan, White and Marshall. Chief Justice Burger joined except in
parts II (dealing with applicability to state officials versus private actors) and IV
and wrote a concurring opinion. Justice Blackmun wrote a concurring opinion and
Justice Stewart entered the dissent, in which Justices Powell and Rehnquist
joined. Richards at 282-86 and notes, as well as the case itself, discuss the various
components of each Justice's rationale.
59. 428 U.S. at 581-82 and Richards at 282 n.47.
60. 428 U.S. at 581.
61. Id. at 598.
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1984

9

Campbell
Law Review,
Vol.REVIEW
7, Iss. 2 [1984], Art. 6
CAMPBELL
LAW

[Vol. 7:231

seemed to say that even if the state had commanded the anticompetitive activity, that command was only the first element needed
to apply the exemption. Additionally, some method of ongoing supervision was needed. 2 Justice Blackmun, in a concurring opinion,
stressed that a balancing test of state and federal interests should
be used in granting Parker exemptions.6 The dissent strongly objected to the plurality's and Blackmun's rationales (but not Chief
Justice Burger's), stating that the exemption should be limited to
those areas where, among other things, the state, not the courts,
feels it should establish anticompetitive measures and that once
the state acting as sovereign has chosen to act anticompetitively
the Parker exemption should apply.6 '
The Cantor decision generally was not relied on in the subsequent cases except for its holding that neutrality by the state in an
anticompetitive program does warrant an exemption. This lack of
reliance is probably because the Cantor plurality discussed such
issues as whether activities by purely private parties should ever be
exempt, what extra limitations would be placed on private parties
if Parker applies, and whether a private actor would be immune
65
from treble damages when the state does not compel the activity.
At first glance Cantorseems to retreat from Goldfarb's reasoning. However, on closer examination, the case follows the basic elements of Parker and Goldfarb. First, neither neutrality nor
prompting by the state is sufficient to empower a private or state
group to act as the state. The state direction must be of such
strength that a reviewing court will be unable to separate the actions of the group from those of the state. Second, the state direction must precede the action. 7 Cantor affirmed both of these
elements.68
62. This is because of the plurality's emphasis on regulation (Id. at 584-85,
596-97, 602), state "decisionmaking" (Id. at 593), and Blackmun's concurring
opinion (Id. at 609).
63. 428 U.S. at 610-11 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 630-31, 637 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Richards, at 286 and n.70.
65. See Part II of the Court's opinion, Id. at 585-92, supra notes 68 and 76
and accompanying text; and City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,
435 U.S. 389, 410 nn. 40, 41 (1978).
66. 428 U.S. at 592-93 and supra note 61.
67. Id. at 602.
68. The plurality felt that Parker did not directly apply because of the private actors. This argument was explicitly rejected by a majority of the Court: Id.
at 603-4 (Burger, C.J. concurring); Id. at 609 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Id. at
622 (Stewart, J., Powell, J., Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol7/iss2/6
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These elements were strengthened further in 1977 when the
Court decided Bates v. State Bar of Arizona. 9 Bates involved the
suspension of two lawyers by the state bar for violating a Disciplinary Rule against any attorney "publicizing" himself or his firm
through newspaper advertisements. 70 The attorneys argued that
the ban on advertising violated the Sherman Act and attorneys'
first amendment rights. 71 The state bar argued that the regulation
was exempt from the Sherman Act because the Disciplinary Rule
was established and enforced by the Arizona Supreme Court 7and,
'2
thus, was action "of the State of Arizona acting as sovereign.
The Court agreed with the state bar and, to help clarify why
the exemption applied, distinguished Goldfarb and Cantor,both of
which held against applying the exemption. In distinguishing
Goldfarb the Court stated that while the minimum fee schedule set
up by the voluntary county bar in Goldfarb was not required by
the State of Virginia, the disciplinary Rule in Bates was "the affirmative command of the Arizona Supreme Court under its
Rules. '7 3 Since the court is the ultimate authority over the state's
practice of law,74 the Rule barring lawyer advertising' 75was "compelled by direction of the State acting as a sovereign.
The Bates Court distinguished Cantor by noting that in Cantor the claim had been made against a private party rather than a
public official or public agency.7 In Bates, the majority declared
that the "Arizona Supreme Court is the real party in interest
[here]. 77 To reinforce that concept the Court pointed out that the
state supreme court in Bates completely defined the state bar's
role in enforcing the Disciplinary Rules and that the bar was under
69. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
70. Id. at 353. Disciplinary Rule 2-101(B), incorporated in Rule 29(a) of
Ariz. Sup. Ct. Rules, 17A ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1976): "(B) A lawyer shall
not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate, or any other lawyer affiliated
with him or his firm, as a lawyer through newspaper or magazine advertisement
. . . nor shall he authorize or permit others to do so in his behalf." Id. at 355.
71. Id. at 353.
72. Id. at 357 (quoting In re Bates, 113 Ariz. 394 at 397, 555 P.2d 640 at 643
(1976)).
73. 433 U.S. at 360.
74. ARIZ. CONST., art. 3; 433 U.S. at 360.
75. 433 U.S. at 360 (quoting 421 U.S. at 791).
76. 433 U.S. at 361, n.13. Justice Blackmun stated, "[Miost obviously, Cantor would have been an entirely different case if the claim had been directed
against a public official or public agency, rather than against a private party." Id.
77. Id. at 361.
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the court's "continuous supervision. 7T Also, the Court stated that
"the regulation of the activities of the bar is at the core of the
State's power to protect the public" while the protection of the
light bulb program was "not essential to the State's regulation of
electric utilities. 7 9 Further, Arizona's Disciplinary Rules reflected
"a clear articulation" of the state's policy and were subject to
"pointed re-examination by the policymaker." 80 In Cantor, however, the light bulb program was "instigated by the utility with
only the acquiescence of the state regulatory commission." 81
The Bates Court held that the Parker exemption extended to
the state bar since it was actually the supreme court which acted
in barring lawyer advertising.2 By emphasizing the state's role as
the actual performer or as the compellor and overseer of the bar's
actions, the Bates decision strengthens Parker's criterion that the
action must be that of the state acting in its sovereign capacity.
In its next important Parker doctrine case, City of Lafayette
v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 83 the Court faced the question of
whether a municipality is exempt from antitrust laws.8 4 In Lafayette, the power company claimed that the city had conspired to
restrain trade in violation of antitrust laws. 5 The city defended,
asserting that Parker held all governmental entities exempt from
antitrust laws simply by their status as governmental entities.8 6
The Court showed that its prior rulings clearly rejected the
city's assertions.8 7 Since the Parker doctrine is limited to "official
action directed by a state" as sovereign,8 8 extending it to a non78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 362.
Id.
The case was reversed, however, on First Amendment grounds. Id. at

384.
83. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
84. See supra, note 45.
85. 435 U.S. at 392. The claim actually was brought in a counterclaim to the
city's suit. The utility argued that the city had conspired with a private electric
cooperative to delay the construction of a nuclear power plant, and had also attempted to restrict competition by using long term contracts and agreements conditioning the continuance of water and gas supplies on purchase of electrical
power from the city. Id. at 392 n.6.
86. Id. at 408.
87. Id. at 408-13; supra note 5 discussing the federalist basis for the Parker
doctrine.
88. 317 U.S. at 351.
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sovereign municipality would. be inconsistent with, and damaging
to, that limitation. 9
The Lafayette Court emphasized, however, that a municipality still might qualify for exemption if it acts pursuant to state
policy, authorization or direction. 90 Therein lies the beginning of
the Court's development of the two step approach clarified by Justice Powell in Hoover and which is essential to Parker doctrine
analysis. If the "conduct engaged in is an act of government by the
State as sovereign,"9' 1 the exemption applies regardless of state motive. This first step pertains to state legislatures and supreme
courts acting in their legislative capacities or where the actor/
agent's role is so "completely defined" by those bodies as to make
the state the "real party in interest." 92 If the first step does not
apply, the exemption will cover the actor/agent only if it acts "pursuant to state policy" and is commanded to act by the state. 9
Then the actor/agent will not be distinguished from the state and
Parker will apply.
In 1980, a unanimous Court continued this approach in California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum,
Inc.94 Midcal involved a California statute which required all wine
producers and wholesalers to file fair trade contracts or price
schedules with the state. The statute prohibited wholesalers from
selling wine to a retailer at other than the price set in the schedule
or contract. If one did so, he became subject to fines and either
license suspension or license revocation.9 5 Midcal, Inc. challenged
that statute as a violation of the Sherman Act. The Liquor Dealers
Association argued that since it acted according to state law it
89. 435 U.S. at'412.
90. Id. at 413-14.
91.

Id. at 413.

92. 433 U.S. at 361.
93. 435 U.S. at 413. This dichotomy was relied on expressly in Midcal and
Hoover. While authors have written much concerning the differences in "command," "compel," "require," "authorize," and "direct," the discussion is actually
"much ado about nothing." These terms simply show a need for the action complained of to be, in fact, that of the state. See generally Morgan, Antitrust and
State Regulation: Standards of Immunity After Midcal, 35 ARK. L. REv. 453
(1981); 16 E J. VON KALINOWSKI, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, ANTITRUST LAWS AND
TRADE REGULATION,

§ 46.03 (1984).

94. 445 U.S. 97 (1980). Justice Brennan took no part in the consideration or
decision of the case. Id. at 114.
95. 445 U.S. at 99-100. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE ANN. § 24.866 (West 1964).
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should be exempt from federal antitrust laws under Parker."
The Court stated that the threshold question was whether the
California wine pricing statute violated the Sherman Act. After
finding that the statute did violate the Act, the Court analyzed the
97
state's participation according to a two part test.
To be exempt under Parker, the Court stated, the challenged
restraint must pass two standards. First, the restraint must be
" 'one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy' "; and "second, the policy must be 'actively supervised' by the
State itself."9 8 The Court held that the first standard was easily
met since the policy was "forthrightly stated and clear in its purpose to permit resale price maintenance." 99 The program, however,
did not satisfy the second standard since the State "simply authorizes price-setting and enforces the prices established by private
parties." There was no state review of the schedules, no monitoring
of the market nor any regulation of the terms of the contracts. 10 0
This two standard test essentially made up the Court's decision. Fortunately, the Court did not discuss the Parker exemption
in terms of a balancing test.1 01 That topic previously had led to
10 2
confusing plurality decisions.
The "two standard test" in Midcal is not to be confused with
the "two step analysis" explained in the Lafayette discussion
above. The two standard test (clear articulation and active supervision) is actually the second prong of the two part analysis. The
Court in Midcal did not discuss the first prong of Lafayette
(whether the actor/agent was, in fact, the state). From the Midcal
decision one can see that first prong would not apply to the Liquor
Dealers Association. 0 " The two standard Midcal test is used when
the first prong of the analysis would not apply.
96. 445 U.S. at 100-02. The State, the original party to the suit, did not seek
certiorari in the Court, but the California Retail Liquor Dealers Association, an
intervenor below, did. Id. at 101-02.
97. Id. at 102-05. This test was first stated this way in New Motor Vehicle
Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978).
98. 445 U.S. at 105 quoting Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 410; Fox, 439 U.S. at 109.
99. 445 U.S. at 105. The policy statement was contained in CAL. Bus. CODE.
infra note 95.
100. 445 U.S. at 105-06.
101. The Court did discuss state interests versus federal interests in its discussion of the Twenty-first Amendment. Id. at 110-14.
102. See supra note 7.
103. The first prong is usually easier to apply when the actor is a state
agency.
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The Court more clearly stated the two prongs of the analysis
in Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder.1 04 There
the issue was whether a "home rule" municipality should be exempt from federal antitrust laws.' °5 The city passed an ordinance
that placed a temporary suspension on cable television expansion
into new service areas. Community Communications complained
that this action illegally restricted competition. The city alleged
that Parker exempted it from federal antitrust laws when enacting
its ordinances. 0 6
The Court analyzed the problem in two parts. The first was
whether the challenged ordinance constituted the state acting in
its sovereign capacity. On this issue the Court held that only states
have sovereignty under federalist principles (on which Parker was
decided). 07 Furthermore, sovereignty cannot be transferred by
states to any political subdivision. Cities, even home-rule cities
were ruled not to be sovereign."' 8 Next, since the city did not qualify as a sovereign unit and its actions were not state actions, the
Court addressed whether the ordinance was an express implementation of state policy for which the exemption would apply.1 0 9 The
Court rejected this idea, stating that the policy was not clearly articulated or affirmatively expressed but was rather a policy of
"neutrality.' 1
Beyond a short discussion of balancing federal and state interests, the Court held consistently with its previous decisions concerning federalist beginnings of the exemption and the two step
analysis necessary for implementing it.
ANALYSIS

In holding that the state bar's and the Committee on Examinations and Admissions' actions were exempt from antitrust laws,
104. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
105. Id. at 43. A "home rule" municipality is one whose ordinances are
granted, by the State Constitution, the right to supercede any conflicting state
law. COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6.
106. 445 U.S. at 46-47.
107. Id. at 52-54. Richards at 303. Burling, et. al. at 831.
108. Id.
109. 455 U.S. at 52-53. The City argued that since the home rule provision
gave local autonomy to Boulder, an inference was created that Boulder's anticompetitive action was within contemplation of that provision. Id.
110. Id. at 55.
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the plurality in Hoover"' consolidated the prior cases' holdings,
dicta and reasonings and formulated a workable solution to the
problem of applying the Parker exemption. That solution is a clarification of the two step analysis applied first in Lafayette."2
The first "critical step" is to determine whether the challenged
conduct is that of the state acting as a sovereign." 3 If so, then the
conduct is exempt from antitrust legislation. If not, then the second step must be taken. That step is the two tiered requirement of
Midcal. Namely, if the conduct is "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" by the sovereign and if the conduct is "actively
4
supervised" by the sovereign, the actions will be exempt."
Justice Powell explained the above analysis clearly." 5 Decisions of the state supreme court, acting legislatively rather than
judicially, and actions by the state legislature are deemed actions
by the sovereign." 6 Additionally, when the "conduct at issue is in
fact that of the state legislature or supreme court" the first step
applies." 7 This "action in fact" is an important element since,
practically, state courts must delegate many of their duties and responsibilities to non-sovereign actors. State action in fact exists
whenever the actions of the actor/agent are "commanded""' by
the state to such a degree that those actions, in reality are those of
the state. This part of the analysis should be narrowly applied in
order to protect the federalist concept behind Parker.The specific
actions must be so clearly required by the state as to make the
actor/agent and the state indistinguishable from one another. Once
this fusion of actor/agent and state is shown, the Parker exemption
will apply.
When the anticompetitive actions are carried out by actors/
agents merely pursuant to state "authorization" and are not "directly those of the legislature or supreme court", closer analysis is
needed." 9 Then, the non-sovereign actor/agent must show "that
the conduct is pursuant to a clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed state policy to replace competition with regulation," and
111. Supra, note 7.
112.
113.

Supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
104 S. Ct. at 1995-96.

114. Id. at 1995; supra text at notes 18-20.
115. 104 S. Ct. at 1995.
116. Id. at 1995-96.
117. Id.

118. 317 U.S. at 350-51.
119.

104 S. Ct. at 1995.
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that the state supervises the conduct at issue. 120 A showing that
the conduct was "prompted" 121 or "contemplated"' 2 by the state,
or that the state was "neutral"' 23 to the actions will not be
enough.'24 The actions must be "compelled" by direction of the
25
state. 1
Since the Court found the contested action in Hoover to be
that of the supreme court, not the state bar, the plurality found no
need to look for a clearly articulated policy or active supervision to
apply the exemption. In reaching its conclusion that the "real
party in interest" was the supreme court, the Court noted the
strict powers of control exercised by the supreme court over all actions of the Committee. The Arizona Supreme Court had state
constitutional power to determine who would and would not be admitted to the bar. 26 While the court did delegate to the Committee the responsibility for preparing, administering and grading the
examination,' 2 7 the court selected all members of the Committee
and retained strict supervisory powers of preview (and review) over
the Committee's actions. 2 8 According to the supreme court Rules,
the Committee could not act unless permitted by the court. One of
the supervisory powers was the exact conduct of which Ronwin
complained-the establishment of a grading formula. As the Hoover Court noted, Rule 28(c) VII B required the Committee to submit its grading formula to the Supreme Court at least thirty days
prior to the examination. 129 Because of these facts the Court held
the exemption applicable by the first step.
Importantly, the plurality and the dissent basically agreed
that the two part analysis should be used in state action cases. The
dissent, in noting that the potential for conflict arises whenever
essentially private agencies are given authority to carry out the anticompetitive policies of the state, offered two methods to avoid
such potential. Either the state can formulate and carry out the
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
421 U.S. at 791.
435 U.S. at 414.
Id.
Similarly stated in 428 U.S. at 592-93.
421 U.S. at 791.
104 S.Ct. at 1991.
The taking of the exam was required for admission to the bar. Id. at

1992.
128. Id. at 1997.
129. Id. at 1997 and n.22.
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policies itself or it can clearly articulate, affirmatively express and
appropriately supervise the actions of a delegated authority.' 30 For
all intents and purposes, this is the same test that the plurality
used.
The difference between the plurality and the dissent lies in
determining just what is needed for actor/agent conduct to constitute "the state acting as sovereign." The plurality found that Bates
controlled that determination. Since, in Bates, the state supreme
court's supervision of the disciplinary rules were statutorally so
pervasive and its control over the prior, final say of all enforcement
actions so complete, the actions of the state bar could not be divorced from those of the State. 13' "The logic of the Court's holding
in Bates applies with greater force than the Committee and its actions" in Hoover.132 Besides all of the factors mentioned above, the
' 33
Committee members were all "state officers.'
Consequently, in Hoover, there was no need for the "affirmative command," the clearly articulated policy or the active supervision. In fact, the command and supervision both existed. To demand a policy statement from the state in this case would be to
"misconceive the basis of the state action doctrine. The reason that
state action is immune from Sherman Act liability is not that the
State has chosen to act in an anti-competitive fashion, but that the
State itself has chosen to act."'13 4 This is the essence of the Parker
doctrine.
The dissent would pose much stricter limits when determining
whether the actions of a Committee or agency are in fact those of
the state. The dissent likens this case to Goldfarb.'3 5 Bates troubled the dissent because, while in Bates there existed an "affirmative command" under Rules 27(a) and 29(a) for the actions complained of there, no "affirmative command" existed in the Rules of
the Arizona Supreme Court as to the use of any particular grading
scheme in Hoover. 3 6 Since there was no "requirement" by the
130. Id. at 2004 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 1996-98.
132. Id. at 1997.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1998.
135. Id. at 2006-07 (Stevens J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 2005 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "In short, one looks in vain in Arizona law, petitioners' briefs, or the pronouncements of the Arizona Supreme
Court for an articulation of any policy besides that of admitting only competent
attorneys to practice in Arizona." Id.
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state that the Committee propose a specific grading scale for the
purpose of limiting the number of lawyers in the bar, the actions
could not be that of the state.
The need for a "requirement" misses the point of the exemption entirely. If a clearly articulated policy were required of the
state each time it wished to act anticompetitively, the Parker doctrine would be emasculated. The state is exempt from federal antitrust laws not because it can show good cause or a compelling
need. It is exempt simply because it is a state. The motives behind
its anticompetitive practices cannot be questioned with regard to
the Sherman Act. This concept must extend to an actor/agent who
performs subject completely to the supervision of the sovereign. A
sovereign must delegate actions. When it gives specific powers to
delegatees, retains active supervision over all the delegate's actions
and provides the final determination for the delegate's recommendations (as the supreme court did here) before action is taken,
then it must be recognized that the state is the "real" actor. If for
no other reason, this is why the plurality's decision reflects the
concepts behind Parker. "State action" spoken of in Parker and
exempt from the Sherman Act is state action in fact. In Goldfarb
there was no active supervision by the state,13 therefore, the state
did not have the ultimate responsibility of the fee schedules. Without ultimate power the actions could not be those of the state.
As one can tell, the Court has had trouble clarifying which
words (compelled, directed, authorized) pertain to the first step or
the second step in the proper Parker analysis.1 3 Confusion over
these terms probably led to the dividing point between the plurality and dissent in Hoover. The Court must become less concerned
with the "proper" usage of terms and concentrate on the analysis
clarified by Justice Powell.
Naturally, overlap of terms will exist to some extent when analyzing the two steps. The terms all have strong connotations used
to emphasize how inseparable the actions of the actor/agent must
be from the state's mandate in order for the Parkerdoctrine's application. The inseparability must exist whether the first or second
step covers the actors and their actions. The distinction between
137. 421 U.S. at 791.
138. This trouble arises only when the challenged actions are performed by
actors/agents. The Court faces no trouble when the legislature or supreme court
act in their own capacity. Clearly those actions are exempt from antitrust laws.
They might be invalid if contrary to a federal regulation based on the Commerce
Clause.
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the steps is one of degree. As the mandate becomes clearer, more
compelling, the actor/agent's conduct and identity becomes more
indistinguishable from those of the state and the less a need exists
for a clearly articulated policy. If the mandate is less powerful, the
distinction between the actor/agent and the state becomes more
apparent and the need for the policy statement becomes greater.
This sliding scale exists in order to preserve the balance between the sovereign rights of the states and the purpose of the federal antitrust legislation. When the steps are analyzed according to
this scale of degree, the Court's decisions and Justice Powell's explanation in Hoover of the exemption become clearer.
The Hoover procedure appears to be the standard for analyzing future state action cases. Though the decision itself was a plurality, the two Justices not taking part in the decision were Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor. Justice Rehnquist supported
granting an exemption in four of the six cases discussed herein and
his desire to reinvigorate federalist principles was shown clearly in
National League of Cities v. Usery.13 9 Justice O'Connor opted for
exemption in Boulder.'" With their additional support, the next
state action case promises to give precedential impact to Justice
Powell's analysis in Hoover.
CONCLUSION

The plurality decision in Hoover v. Ronwin plainly shows the
consistency in the Court's prior rulings on the issue of antitrust
exemption for state actions. In fact, the dissenting opinion seems
to put forth the same test. The divergence comes not in formulating the test, but on the question when does a state delegate authority and, yet, still act as sovereign. The Court's confusion in
previous cases over terminology aided in creating this divergence.
In Hoover the plurality's argument is more sensible than the dissent's. Action performed by a committee can be classified as action
by the sovereign, and exempt under the Parker doctrine, if it is in
fact that of the state legislature or supreme court acting in its sovereign, legislative capacity. In order to determine this, one looks at
the actual enabling documents, the level of active, continuous state
supervision and whether the state retains ultimate control over the
139. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Justice Rehnquist voted to apply the exemption in Boulder, Lafayette, Cantor and Bates.
140. Justice O'Connor opted for the exemption in Boulder, the only case
discussed here in which she took part.
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final determination of procedure. To demand, as the dissent does,
a clear articulation of policy each time power to control competition is delegated would render Parker and its progeny useless and
intrude upon the very basis for the doctrine. Justice Powell's analysis, certain to become the standard for future state action cases,
upholds the principles expressed in Parker.
Donald E. Harrop
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